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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between the credit constraints faced by a firm and the unit
value prices of its exports. The paper modifies Melitz’s (2003) model of trade with heterogeneous
firms by introducing endogenous quality and credit constraints. The model predicts that tighter
credit constraints faced by a firm reduce its optimal prices as its choice of lower-quality products
dominates the price distortion effect resulting from credit constraints under the endogenous quality
case. However, when endogenous quality choice is not possible under the exogenous quality case,
there is an opposite prediction that prices increase as firms face tighter credit constraints. An
empirical analysis using Chinese bank loans data, Chinese firm-level data from the National Bureau
of Statistics of China (NBSC), and Chinese customs data strongly supports the predictions of the
endogenous quality case and confirms the mechanism of quality adjustment: firms optimally choose
to produce lower-quality products when facing tighter credit constraints. Moreover, the predictions
of the exogenous quality case are supported by using quality-adjusted prices in regression analysis
and by using quality variation across firms within the same product.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing body of literature on the effects of credit constraints on international trade, es-
pecially after the financial crisis of 2008. Most prior studies have focused on either explaining the
mechanism of why exporters need more credit than domestic producers (e.g., Amiti and Weinstein,
2011; Feenstra et al., forthcoming), or the consequences of different credit conditions on export per-
formance, comparative advantage, multinational activities and spillovers.1 However, to the best of our
knowledge, the impacts of credit constraints on a firm’s choice of optimal quality and optimal price
have not been explored. This paper fills a gap in the literature by linking credit constraints to firm
attributes and action such as its productivity and its choice of product quality and optimal prices.
Understanding the mechanism through which credit constraints affect export prices helps us better
understand how credit constraints affect a firm’s exporting behavior via optimal choice of quality and
pricing. In particular, it helps to explain the differential impacts of credit constraints on the intensive
margin of trade across products through their effects on the unit value prices of different products.
As the intensive margin of a product is measured by the total value of its exports, the change in
the intensive margin is affected by two factors: the change in the quantity exported, and the change
in the unit value price of the exported product. Therefore, a thorough analysis on the effect of
credit constraints on unit value prices can help us better understand their effect on the intensive
margin of trade. Moreover, credit constraints affect bank loans to firms, which are used to cover
upfront costs. Tighter credit constraints would affect upfront costs and therefore distort a firm’s
choice of optimal price more than before. As noted in the literature on financial distress, binding
credit constraints may cause firms to act in ways that would be suboptimal in normal times, which
may lead them to produce lower-quality products, which in turn lowers the unit value price of the
product (Phillips and Sertsios, 2011). However, how and why credit constraints affect the export
prices of different products differently has not been studied thoroughly. Our paper tries to fill this
gap in the literature.
To study the impacts of credit constraints on export prices, we build a heterogenous-firm trade
model with endogenous quality and credit constraints. The introduction of credit constraints acts
through two channels. First, we assume that firms must externally finance a certain fraction of its
total costs in order to produce as well as to enter foreign markets. This fraction captures the credit
needs of the firm. The higher is this fraction, the more likely the firm faces binding credit constraints.
Second, we assume that due to frictions in the financial markets, a firm cannot borrow more than
a certain fraction of its expected cash flow. This fraction of a firm’s expected cash flow capture the
firm’s credit access. To sum up, a firm is more likely to have tighter credit constraints if it has a higher
level of “credit needs” or faces a lower level of “credit access”.
1See Manova (2013), Manova et al. (2011), Chor and Manova (2012), Minetti and Zhu (2011), Ju and Wei (2011),
Chaney (2005), Agarwal et al. (2013), Jarreau and Poncet (2011), Besedesˇ et al. (2013), Wang (2012), among others.
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The theory indicates that the impacts of credit constraints on prices depend on two opposing
forces: (i) the quality adjustment effect, which lowers product quality and therefore reduces prices when
credit constraints are more stringent; (ii) the price distortion effect, which increases price when credit
constraints are tighter. The intuition behind the price distortion effect is as follows. Given product
quality, a firm facing tighter credit constraints will reduce its output, leading to excess demand for
its product at the initial price level, which in turn pushes up its price. We call this effect the price
distortion effect. When product quality is endogenously chosen by a firm and there is a large scope
for quality variation, the quality adjustment effect dominates the price distortion effect, and therefore
optimal prices fall when firms face tighter credit constraints. On the contrary, when the endogenous
quality choice is not allowed, the theory predicts the opposite outcome: the existence of more stringent
credit constraints would raise optimal prices. Meanwhile, the relationship between export prices and
firm productivity also depends on whether the quality is an endogenous choice by the firm: prices
increase in productivity under the endogenous quality case while decrease in productivity under the
exogenous quality case.
Next, we test our model using a matched Chinese firm-product level dataset, based on Chinese
firm-level production data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) and Chinese
customs data at the transaction-product level. The unique advantage of this matched database is
that it contains information on unit value prices of exports at the product-firm level as well as the
information needed to measure credit constraints and firm productivity. To measure the severity of
credit constraints via credit needs faced by firms, we first follow Manova et al. (2011) to employ four
different measures at the industry level: external finance dependence, R&D intensity, inventory-to-
sales ratio, and asset tangibility. We use US data for those measures in our main regressions because
the US financial markets are mature and they could reflect true credit needs by industry. Also the
measures based on US data have been widely used in cross-country studies in the literature. For
robustness, we also follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Manova (2013) to calculate external finance
dependence using Chinese firm-level data. To proxy for credit access, we collect balances of bank
credits, long-term bank loans and short-term bank loans by province (normalized by province GDP)
in China to reflect the credit access by firms located in different regions. In addition, we compare
different types of firm ownership in China as each type is expected to be associated with a different
level of credit access. Finally, to compute productivity, we use the augmented Olley and Pakes’s
(1996) approach, which alleviates simultaneity bias and selection bias, to estimate a firm’s total factor
productivity. In the robustness checks, we also report results with labor productivity measured by the
value added per employee and the results with the TFP computed by the augmented Ackerberg et al.’s
(2006) approaches.
We test the empirical implications of our model and the results strongly support the theoretical
predictions of the endogenous quality case: First, tighter credit constraints (i.e., either a higher level of
credit needs or a lower level of credit access) significantly reduce export prices, ceteris paribus. Second,
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when a firm faces more stringent credit constraints, it produces lower-quality products. Third, there is
a positive relationship between export prices and firm productivity. Our results are robust to various
specifications, including the estimations with different fixed effects and clustering at different levels.
We also verify the quality-adjustment mechanism and test the exogenous-quality case through
two exercises. First, we estimate quality and quality-adjusted prices by adopting Khandelwal et al.’s
(forthcoming) method, in which quality-adjusted price is defined as observed price less estimated qual-
ity. We then replicate the baseline regressions with estimated quality and quality-adjusted prices as
dependent variable. When we regress quality-adjusted prices, the results are consistent with the pre-
dictions of the exogenous quality case: tighter credit constraints raise export prices; more productive
firms set lower prices; the positive effects of credit access on prices are attenuated, and, sometimes,
become significantly negative. Second, we compare the results based on a set of products with higher
variation in product quality and those based on another set of products with lower variation in prod-
uct quality. We find that firms producing products associated with higher quality variation are more
affected by credit constraints and the observed product prices are more in line with the predictions
of the endogenous quality case. In other words, the magnitudes of the predicted effects of credit
constraints on prices are larger for the observations with more variation of quality, thus validating the
mechanism of quality adjustment.
The main contribution of this paper is that it presents theory and evidence from highly disag-
gregated Chinese data that tighter credit constraints induce firms to lower the quality of products
they export and thus reduce export prices. This contributes to the emerging literature on the role
of financial constraints in international trade. To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the
first compelling analysis of the impacts of credit constraints on export prices under a heterogeneous-
firm framework. This paper also complements the large quality-and-trade literature in confirming
the prevalence of product quality heterogeneity at the firm level and explaining the mechanism of
quality adjustment. Our finding of a positive relationship between export prices and firm produc-
tivity is consistent with the findings in the literature on product quality (e.g., Verhoogen, 2008;
Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Hallak, 2010; Johnson, 2012; and Hallak and Sivadasan, 2011).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a trade model with het-
erogeneous firms, featuring endogenous product quality and credit constraints to illustrate the impact
of credit constraints on the optimal prices of exports. Section 3 describes the data and introduces
the strategy of the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 provides
some robustness checks. The final section concludes.
2 A Model of Credit Constraints, Quality, and Export Prices
In this section we present a partial equilibrium model to study the behavior of the unit value export
prices across firms that compete for the same product-destination market. The model modifies the
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heterogeneous-firm trade model of Melitz (2003), by incorporating endogenous quality and credit
constraints in the analysis. Goods are differentiated, and each good is produced by one firm. The
main departure from the existing literature is that firms are heterogeneous in both their productivity
and the degree of credit constraints they face. Firms choose not only the optimal price but also the
optimal product quality.
2.1 Preferences and the Market Structure
We denote the source country by i and the destination country by j, where i, j ∈ 1, . . . , N . Country
j is populated by a continuum of consumers of measure Lj. Consumers in country j have access to
a set of goods Ωj, which is potentially different across countries. In each source country i, there is
a continuum of firms that ex ante differ in their productivity level, φ, the degree of credit access,
θ, and the credit needs, d. A firm facing higher θ has more credit access; a firm with higher d has
greater credit needs. A lower level of θ or a higher level of d implies tighter credit constraints for this
firm (see Section 2.2 for more detail). We assume that a representative consumer in country j has a
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility function given by:
Uj =
(∫
ω∈Ωj
[qij (ω)xij (ω)]
σ−1
σ dω
) σ
σ−1
where qij (ω) is the quality of variety ω originated from country i; xij (ω) is country j’s quantity
consumed of variety ω originated from country i; and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties. Therefore, consumer optimization yields the following demand function for variety ω:
xij (ω) = [qij(ω)]
σ−1 [pij (ω)]
−σ
P 1−σj
Yj (1)
where pij (ω) is the price of variety ω, Pj =
(∫
ω∈Ωj
[pij (ω) /qij(ω)]
1−σ dω
) 1
1−σ
is an aggregate price
index (adjusted by the demand shifter), and Yj represents the total expenditure of country j. Given
the same price, higher-quality products generate a larger demand.
2.2 The Firm’s Problem
A firm’s technology is captured by a cost function that features, for any given quality, a constant
marginal cost with a fixed overhead cost. Labor is the only factor of production. Following convention,
we assume that there is an iceberg trade cost such that τij ≥ 1 units of good must be shipped from
country i in order for one unit to arrive in j. Firms face no trade costs in selling in its home market,
i.e., τii = 1. To simplify notation, the subscripts for source and destination as well as the index for
variety are suppressed hereafter. In addition, the wage rate of the source country is normalized to
one.
5
We assume that there is a positive relationship between quality and marginal cost of production.
The rationale is that a higher marginal cost is required to produce a higher-quality product. The
positive relationship between quality and marginal cost is common to the recent quality-and-trade
literature, for instance, Verhoogen (2008) and Johnson (2012). In this paper, the marginal cost of
production is assumed to be qα/φ, where α ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the marginal cost increases in quality q,
and α captures the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to quality.
Except for variable cost, firms face fixed cost in producing and exporting goods, fqβ (β > 0), where
f is a constant and 1/β measures the effectiveness of fixed investment in raising quality. The fixed
cost represents the fixed investments in production and export associated with quality improvement
(e.g., costs of employing higher-quality inputs, R&D expenditures to improve the product quality, or
the changes in modes of international shipping from ocean freight to air freight, etc.).2
We posit that all firms are subject to possible liquidity constraints in paying all types of costs.
Like the extended model in Manova (2013), we assume that exporters need to raise outside capital for
a fraction d ∈ (0, 1) of all costs associated with foreign sales, including variable costs and fixed costs
mentioned above.3 This fraction d represents the financial needs of a firm. The higher the financial
needs, the higher is d, and we call this fraction d the “credit needs” parameter. We also assume that,
constrained by the level of financial development, firms cannot borrow more than a fraction θ of the
expected cash flow from exporting. If θ is higher, firms can borrow more from external finance (mainly
through bank loans). Therefore, θ is referred to as the credit access by firms. A higher level of credit
needs d or a lower level of credit access θ implies that firms are more likely to face tighter credit
constraints. Consequently, the optimization problem of a firm with productivity φ, credit access θ,
and credit needs d is given by:4
max
p,q
(
p−
τqα
φ
)
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y − fqβ (2)
s.t. θ
[(
p− (1− d)
τqα
φ
)
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y − (1− d) fqβ
]
(3)
≥ d
[
τqα
φ
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y + fqβ
]
where budget constraint (3) can be viewed as the “cash flow constraint” condition, in the same spirit
as Manova (2013) and Feenstra et al. (forthcoming). Solving this optimization problem by choosing
2In this paper we only consider exporting firms.
3We also consider the case when only fixed costs are financed by outside capital in Appendix (see Appendix C), and
this change in the model’s set-up does not alter the main predictions of our model.
4For simplicity of notation, we suppress variety ω and subscripts of country (i, j). It should be also pointed out
that we do not consider the intertemporal structure of costs of borrowing from banks as the current model is a static,
one-period model.
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price p and quality q yields
p =
σ
σ − 1
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
τqα
φ
(4)
qσ−1
p1−σ
P 1−σ
Y =
σβ
(1− α) (σ − 1)
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
fqβ (5)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint condition (3) (see Appendix
A for the detailed derivation of first-order conditions).
The budget constraint (3), together with conditions (4) and (5), yield:
σβ
(1− α) (σ − 1)
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
≥
(
1− d+
d
θ
)(
β
1− α
+ 1
)
(6)
Given credit needs d, there exists a cutoff level of credit access θh such that budget constraint (3) is
binding if and only if θ < θh.
5 Likewise, given credit access θ, there exists a cutoff level of credit needs
above which the budget constraint (3) is binding. Next, we analyze two cases according to whether
budget constraint (3) is binding.
Case 1: The budget constraint (3) is binding, i.e., θ < θh.
Let ∆ ≡
(
1 + d (1−θ)λ
θ(1+λ)
)
, which reflects the price distortion based on equation (4). Accord-
ing to equation (6), we obtain the expression for ∆ after eliminating λ: ∆ ≡
(
1 + d (1−θ)λ
θ(1+λ)
)
=(
1− d+ d
θ
) (
σ−1
σ
)(
1 + 1−α
β
)
. Therefore, ∆ is only related to credit access θ and credit needs d.
In other words, credit access θ and credit needs d form a sufficient statistic for the price distortion.
We call this effect the price distortion effect. It is obvious that the extent to which price is distorted is
related to credit access θ and credit needs d. Lower credit access θ or higher credit needs d increases
the price distortion caused by the binding budget constraint. The intuition behind the price distor-
tion effect is as follows. Given product quality, a firm facing tighter credit constraints will reduce its
output, leading to excess demand for its product at the initial price level, which in turn pushes up its
price.
Now, equations (3) and (4) imply that the optimal quality chosen by firms satisfies the following
condition:
qβ−(1−α)(σ−1) =
(1− α) (σ − 1)
σβf
∆−σ
(
σ
σ − 1
τ
φ
)1−σ Y
P 1−σ
(7)
Define condition (i) as β > (1− α) (σ − 1). Under condition (i), there is a positive correlation between
firm productivity φ and quality q, given credit access θ and credit needs d. This suggests that more
productive firms choose higher quality, which is consistent with the findings of the quality-and-trade
literature. Condition (i) ensures the existence of the optimal quality. Otherwise, if β is too small, it
5Equation (6) implies that budget constraint (3) is binding if and only if θ < θh, where θh =
d(σ−1)(1−α+β)
σβ−(1−d)(σ−1)(1−α+β)
.
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implies that the firm could easily improve quality without incurring large fixed cost (recall that fqβ
represents the fixed cost), and then the firm would choose quality q to be infinite.
Given firm productivity, condition (i) also ensures that a firm with more credit access or less credit
needs chooses higher optimal quality. This is because equation (7) tells us that, given productivity,
an increase in θ or a reduction in d (i.e., more credit access or lower credit needs) relaxes the firm’s
credit constraints through the change in ∆, and therefore induces the firm to choose a higher optimal
quality q, which in turn leads to a higher price set by the firm. We call this mechanism the quality
adjustment effect.
Hence, the optimal pricing rule (4), together with (7), yield:
p =
(
(1− α) (σ − 1)
σβf
)Ψ
∆1−σΨ
(
σ
σ − 1
τ
φ
)1+(1−σ)Ψ( Y
P 1−σ
)Ψ
(8)
where Ψ = α
β−(1−α)(σ−1) > 0. Define Condition (ii) as β < (σ − 1). If Condition (ii) holds (in
addition to Condition (i) ), then a firm’s optimal price is positively correlated with firm productivity
as conditions (i) and (ii) together imply that 1 + (1− σ)Ψ < 0. The condition (ii) ensures that β is
not too large. If β is too large, it would be difficult for the firm to adjust quality and to choose higher-
quality product as the elasticity of fixed cost with respect to quality is high: a small improvement
in quality would incur a large increase in fixed cost. Therefore, a very large β is equivalent to the
case that the firm cannot flexibly choose optimal quality, and thus quality variance is small. Under
this case, the price distortion effect would dominate the quality adjustment effect, and this would
generate the same prediction as in an exogenous-quality model, i.e., a model where endogenous
quality choice is not allowed. In this paper, our focus is endogenous quality choice but we will also
compare the implications of both endogenous and exogenous quality in the end of this section.
Let us define condition (A) as 1
β
> 1
σ−1 >
1−α
β
. Condition (i) and (ii) combined is equivalent
to condition (A). When condition (A) holds, a firm with higher productivity charges higher optimal
prices. The intuition behind this positive correlation between firm productivity and export prices is
due to two opposing forces: the quality adjustment effect (i.e., higher-productivity firms set higher
prices via selling higher-quality products) and the productivity effect (i.e., higher-productivity firms
are able to charge lower prices via having lower marginal cost for any given quality). When the quality
adjustment effect dominates the productivity effect, there exists a positive relationship between firm
productivity and export prices.
Under condition (A), 1 − σΨ < 0 is also satisfied. Hence, tighter credit constraints (via either
higher credit needs d or lower credit access θ) eventually reduce the optimal price. This implies
that the quality adjustment effect dominates the price distortion effect. Here, the impact of credit
constraint on export prices also depends on two opposing forces: One is caused by the price distortion
∆ induced by credit constraints (i.e., the price distortion effect). The other is caused by the optimal
product quality chosen by the firm (i.e., the quality adjustment effect). The former effect tends to
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Figure 1: The relationship between prices, TFP, and credit constraints
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log(TFP) 
increase the optimal price when a firm faces higher credit needs d and lower credit access θ (i.e., when
d increases or θ decreases, the price distortion ∆ increases and therefore price increases according to
equation (4)). However, the latter effect tends to reduce the optimal price when a firm faces tighter
credit constraints. This is because tighter credit constraints induce ∆ to increase, and hence induce
firms to produce a lower-quality product according to equation (7), which in turn lowers optimal
price according to equation (4). Under condition (A), the quality adjustment effect dominates, and
therefore, firms facing tighter credit constraints set lower prices. The graph in the left panel of Figure
1 illustrates the relationship between (log) price, (log) TFP, and credit constraints when condition
(A) holds under Case 1: the solid line corresponds to more relaxed credit constraint (i.e., a higher θ
and a lower d), and the dashed line captures the tighter credit constraint situation (i.e., a lower θ and
a higher d).
Case 2: The budget constraint (3) is nonbinding, i.e., θ > θh.
Equations (4) and (5) imply:
qβ−(1−α)(σ−1) =
(1− α) (σ − 1)
σβf
(
σ
σ − 1
τ
φ
)1−σ Y
P 1−σ
(9)
Under Condition (i), the firm with higher productivity will choose higher quality. Thus, equation (9),
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together with (4), imply that the optimal pricing rule is given by
p =
(
(1− α) (σ − 1)
σβf
)Ψ( σ
σ − 1
τ
φ
)1+(1−σ)Ψ( Y
P 1−σ
)Ψ
(10)
When condition (A) holds, then 1+(1−σ)Ψ < 0, and so equation (10) implies that there is a positive
relationship between price and productivity. Therefore, the solid line in the left panel of Figure 1
still describes the relationship between (log) price and (log) TFP. However, the optimal prices are
not affected by credit access θ or credit needs d anymore, as firms have sufficient credit access (i.e.,
θ > θh). Therefore, the solid line in the left panel of Figure 1 does not shift as θ or d changes.
2.3 Predictions
In the rest of this paper, we will concentrate on the central case when Case 1 and Condition (A) both
hold. These parameter conditions are supported by empirical evidence. For example, based on the data
of Chinese exporting firms, Manova and Zhang (2012) propose that more successful exporters with
higher export revenue or larger export scope produce higher quality goods and charge higher export
prices, implying that the parameter restrictions given by condition (A) tend to hold for Chinese data.
Ge et al. (2012) also find that more productive firms charge higher export prices using Chinese firm
data. Later, our empirical results also confirm this point. Henceforth, unless otherwise noted, we
focus on Case 1 when Condition (A) holds. Therefore, we have the following testable propositions:
Proposition 1. Given firm productivity, tighter credit constraints resulting from either lower level of
credit access (i.e., a lower θ) or from higher credit needs (i.e., a higher d) reduce the optimal export
price set by a firm. In this case, export prices increase with productivity, ceteris paribus.
Proposition 2. (Quality Adjustment Effect): Given productivity, tighter credit constraints (i.e.,
higher d or lower θ) lower the optimal product quality chosen by a firm.
Propositions 1 and 2 are based on the assumption that quality is endogenously chosen by firms and
therefore there could be heterogeneity of product quality across firms. Next, we carry out analyses
based on the original Melitz-type model (Melitz, 2003), i.e., the exogenous-quality model, in which
quality is exogenous and out of the firm’s decision choice. By doing so, we are able to examine the
implications of the endogenous-quality model vis-a`-vis the exogenous-quality model.
Exogenous Quality
In this case, quality adjustment effect does not exist and productivity only affects marginal cost,
leading to the optimal price decreasing in productivity. The intuition for this case is straightforward:
more productive firms face lower marginal cost of production and hence charge lower prices to out-
perform the market. Also, because there is no quality adjustment effect, tighter credit constraints
(i.e., a higher d or a lower θ) increase the optimal prices charged by firms in the exogenous-quality
Melitz-type model due to the price distortion effect. See the graph in the right panel of Figure 1 for
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illustration. We summarize the properties for the exogenous-quality model in the following proposition
(see Appendix B for the proof of Proposition 3).
Proposition 3. When quality is exogenous, given firm productivity, tighter credit constraints (higher
d or lower θ) increase the optimal price set by a firm. In this case, export prices decrease with
productivity, ceteris paribus.
Only Fixed Costs are Externally Financed
In the earlier discussion, we assume that all firms are subject to credit constraints in paying all
costs. Therefore, both the variable costs and fixed costs cannot be totally financed internally and
firms need to raise outside capital for a fraction d ∈ (0, 1) of all costs. However, if firms only need to
raise outside capital for a fraction d ∈ (0, 1) of fixed costs (but not the variable costs), price distortion
induced by credit constraints does not exist. As a result, the optimal price is unrelated to credit
constraint when quality is exogenous. Nevertheless, the predictions under the endogenous quality case
remain unchanged. We summarize this case in the following proposition (see Appendix C for the proof
of Proposition 4).
Proposition 4. When only fixed costs are financed by outside capital and variable costs can be totally
financed internally, tighter credit constraints (i.e., a higher d or a lower θ) reduce the optimal price
under the endogenous quality case. In this case, prices increase with productivity, ceteris paribus. How-
ever, when there is no endogenous quality choice, the optimal price is unrelated to credit constraints.
In this case, prices decrease with productivity, ceteris paribus.
The discussion in this section suggests that, according to whether the quality is an endogenous
choice by the firm, there could be different predictions on the impact of credit constraints on export
prices as well as the relationship between export prices and firm productivity. As illustrated in the
left panel of Figure 1, the model that assumes that quality is endogenous yields a positive relationship
between productivity and export prices, and we expect tighter credit constraints to lower the optimal
prices set by the firm as the quality adjustment effect dominates. On the other hand, the model
that assumes that quality is exogenous yields a negative relationship between productivity and export
prices, and we expect that tighter credit constraints increase the optimal prices as the only effect that
exists is the price distortion effect. We will use Chinese data to test both theories. Our results lend
support to the endogenous-quality model and confirm the mechanism of quality adjustment.
3 Empirical Specification, Data and Measurement
In this section, we specify our econometric models and describe the data and measurements that are
used to estimate them.
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3.1 Estimating Equations
3.1.1 Baseline Specification: Price Equations
The propositions in Section 2 imply that export prices are affected by credit access or credit needs.
We test the proposed propositions with the following baseline reduced-form equation:
log pricefh(c)t = b0 + b1 log(TFPft) + γXft + χ1FinDevr + χ2ExtF ini + ϕh(c) + ϕt + ǫfh(c)t (11)
where pricefh(c)t represents the unit value export price of product h (disaggregated at HS 8-digit level,
which is the most disaggregate level for Chinese products) exported by firm f located in province r to
destination country c in year t (where the country subscript c is optional when product is defined as
HS8 product category instead of HS8-country combination); TFPft denotes a firm f ’s productivity
in year t; Xft is a vector of time-varying attributes of firm f in year t which can potentially affect
export prices, including firm size (denoted by employment), capital intensity, and average wage per
worker; FinDevr captures the credit access in province r where the firm is located; ExtF ini reflects
the credit needs at industry i and external finance dependence is one of the most important credit
needs measures; ϕh(c) and ϕt are fixed effect terms of HS8 product (or HS8-destination) and year,
respectively; ǫfh(c)t is the error term that includes all unobserved factors that may affect export prices.
As there are different sources of variation of export prices (e.g., firm, product, destination country,
and year), we deal with them carefully in identification. Except for the year fixed effects, in the
baseline regression we employ the variation across firms within a product (or product-destination
market) by including the product (or product-destination) fixed effect terms. We do not include the
province fixed effects in the baseline specification because province fixed effect terms absorb the effects
of credit access measures. We also cluster error terms at firm level in the baseline specification to
address the potential correlation of error terms within each firm across different products over time.
It is worth noting the different mappings between industry i and product h when we use the US data
and Chinese data to compute credit needs measures. Therefore, the product or product-destination
fixed effect terms refer to different aggregation levels of product in different context of data. When we
use Chinese data to compute credit needs measure at industry level based on Chinese industrial clas-
sification, we can include HS8-product-destination fixed effects in our baseline regressions. However,
if we follow the standard literature in trade and finance (e.g., Manova, 2013; Kroszner et al., 2007)
to measure credit needs based on US data, our product fixed effect terms will be measured at HS4
level, or roughly speaking, at broader industry level, due to the mapping between HS product and
ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification) industry. See more detailed discussion on this
issue in Section 3.3.2 about measures of credit needs.
We acknowledge that the baseline specification works with different dimensions of the data, in-
cluding firm, product, destination, year, and region, which makes the identification more complicated.
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The complication is unavoidable not only due to the merging process between the US data and Chi-
nese data but also due to the nature of credit constraint measures: credit access and credit needs are
measured at different dimensions of the data, i.e., the key measures of credit access is regional while
the measures of credit needs are at industry level (see sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 for more detail). In
order to clearly identify the effects of credit constraints on export prices, we also adopt alternative
specifications, including cross-sectional estimation, adding different fixed effects at firm level, regional
level, or industry level, and clustering at different levels. We will address those when presenting results
in Section 4.1.
3.1.2 Quality Equations
Quality can only be inferred indirectly from observed prices and demands. Following Khandelwal et al.
(forthcoming), we estimate export “quality” of product h shipped to a destination country c by firm
f in year t, qfhct, via the following empirical demand equation based on equation (1), the demand
equation, in our model:
xfhct = q
σ−1
fhctp
−σ
fhctP
σ−1
ct Yct (12)
where xfhct denotes the demand for a particular firm’s export of product h in destination country c.
We then take logs of the above equation, and use the residual from the following OLS regression to
infer quality:
log xfhct + σ log pfhct = ϕh + ϕct + ǫfhct (13)
where the product fixed effect ϕh captures the difference in prices and quantities across product
categories due to the inherent characteristics of products; the country-year fixed effect ϕct collects both
the destination price index Pct and income Yct. Then estimated quality is ln(qˆfhct) = ǫˆfhct/(σ − 1).
Consequently, quality-adjusted prices are the observed log prices less estimated effective quality, i.e.,
ln(pfhct) − ln(qˆfhct), denoted by ln(p˜fhct). The intuition behind this approach is that conditional on
price, a variety with a higher quantity is assigned higher quality.6 Given the value of the elasticity of
substitution σ, we are able to estimate quality from equation (13).
The literature yields and employs various estimates of σ. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop
(2004) survey gravity-based estimates of the Armington substitution elasticity, such as Head and Ries
(2001), and conclude that a reasonable range is σ ∈ [5, 10].7 In our estimation, we allow the elasticity
of substitution to vary across industries (σi) by using the estimates of Broda and Weinstein (2006),
but our results are not sensitive to larger choices of σ as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) or a lower and
narrower range of σ as in Simonovska and Waugh (forthcoming).8 After obtaining estimated quality
6See Khandelwal et al. (forthcoming) for detailed review of this approach.
7Waugh (2010) obtain similar estimates based on the sample including both rich and poor countries, though the
parameter has different structural interpretations.
8Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate the elasticity of substitution for disaggregated categories and report that the
average and median elasticity for Standard International Trade Classification 5-digit goods is 7.5 and 2.8, respectively.
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and quality-adjusted price, we replace the dependent variable in the baseline regression, equation
(11), by quality or quality-adjusted price to examine the effect of credit constraints on quality and
net-quality prices.
3.2 Firm-level and Product-level Data
To investigate the relationship between firms’ productivity and their export prices as well as the role
of credit constraints, we merge the following two highly disaggregated large panel Chinese data sets:
(1) the firm-level production data, and (2) the product-level trade data. The sample period is between
2000 and 2006.
The data source for the firm-level production data is the annual surveys of Chinese manufacturing
firms, which was conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). The database covers
all state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and non-state-owned enterprises with annual sales of at least 5
million RMB (Chinese currency).9 Between 2000 and 2006, the approximate number of firms covered
by the NBSC database varied from 163,000 to 302,000. This database has been widely used by previous
studies of Chinese economy and other economic issues using Chinese data (e.g., Cai and Liu, 2009;
Lu et al., 2010; Feenstra et al., forthcoming; Brandt et al., 2012; among others) as it contains detailed
firm-level information of manufacturing enterprises in China, such as ownership structure, employment,
capital stock, gross output, value added, firm identification (e.g., company name, telephone number,
zip code, contact person, etc.), and complete information on the three major accounting statements
(i.e., balance sheets, profit & loss accounts, and cash flow statements). Of all the information contained
in the NBSC Database, we are mostly interested in the variables related to measuring firm total factor
productivity and credit constraints. In order to merge the NBSC Database with the product-level
trade data so as to obtain the export prices for each firm, we also use firm identification information.
As there are some reporting errors in the NBSC database, to clean the NBSC sample, we follow
Feenstra et al. (forthcoming), Cai and Liu (2009), and the General Accepted Accounting Principles to
discard observations for which one of the following criteria is violated: (1) the key financial variables
(such as total assets, net value of fixed assets, sales, gross value of industrial output) cannot be missing;
(2) the number of employees hired by a firm must not be less than 10; (3) the total assets must be
higher than the liquid assets; (4) the total assets must be larger than the total fixed assets; (5) the
total assets must be larger than the net value of the fixed assets; (6) a firm’s identification number
cannot be missing and must be unique; and (7) the established time must be valid (e.g., the opening
month cannot be later than December or earlier than January).
The second database we use is the Chinese trade data at HS 8-digit level, provided by China’s
General Administration of Customs. This Chinese Customs Database covers the universe of all Chi-
We use the concordance between HS 6-digit products and SITC to merge their estimates with our sample.
9It equals US$640,000 approximately, according to the official end-of-period exchange rate in 2006, reported by the
central bank of China.
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nese exporters and importers in 2000-2006. It records detailed information of each trade transactions,
including import and export values, quantities, quantity units, products, source and destination coun-
tries, contact information of the firm (e.g., company name, telephone, zip code, contact person), type
of enterprises (e.g. state owned, domestic private firms, foreign invested, and joint ventures), and
customs regime (e.g. “Processing and Assembling” and “Processing with Imported Materials”). Of
all the information in the customs database, export values and quantities are of special interest to this
study as they yield unit value export prices.
In order to merge the above two databases, we match the product-level trade data contained in the
Chinese Customs Database to data on manufacturing firms contained in the NBSC Database, based on
the contact information of firms, because there is no consistent coding system of firm identity between
these two databases.10 Our matching procedure is done in three steps. First, the vast majority of
firms (89.3%) are matched by company names exactly. Second, an additional 10.1% are matched by
telephone number and zip code exactly. Finally, the remaining 0.6% of firms are matched by telephone
number and contact person name exactly.11 Compared with the manufacturing exporting firms in the
NBSC Database, the matching rate of our sample (in terms of the number of firms) varies from 52%
to 63% between 2000 and 2006, which covers 56% to 63% of total export value reported by the NBSC
Database between 2000 and 2006. In total, the matched sample covers more than 60% of total value
of firm exports in the manufacturing sector reported by the NBSC Database and more than 40% of
total value of firm exports reported by the Customs Database.
3.3 Measurement
3.3.1 Measures of Credit Access
In order to measure credit access, we collect data on the balances of total bank credits, long-term bank
loans, and short-term bank loans and calculate the average bank loans to GDP ratio over the sample
period (2000-2006) at the provincial level.12 As regional heterogeneity in available bank credits and
loans to firms is huge in China, we believe that bank loans by province serve as a good proxy for credit
access, which reflects regional financial development. Our sample includes 31 provincial-level regions
(including 22 provinces, 4 municipalities, and 5 autonomous regions). The data source is Almanac of
China’s Finance and Banking (2000-2007). If the level of financial development is higher, then there is
more credit access for firms and so we expect to see increases in optimal prices under the endogenous
quality model.
10In the NBSC Database, firms are identified by their corporate representative codes and contact information. While
in the Customs Database, firms are identified by their corporate custom codes and contact information. These two
coding systems are neither consistent, nor transferable with each other.
11In order to obtain more precise matching, we do not use contact person and zip code to match trade transactions
to manufacturing firms since there are many different companies, which have the same contact person name in the same
zip-code region.
12Since the variation of regional credit access is persistent over time, this measure has been averaged over years.
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Another measure we use to proxy for credit access is firm ownership. We compare state-owned
enterprises (SOE) with domestic private enterprises (DPE) and multinational corporation (MNC) with
joint venture (JV). We compare different types of firms in China because the literature clearly suggests
that given the underdevelopment of Chinese financial markets, the Chinese DPE face less credit access
than SOE do, because SOE can finance a larger share of their investments through external financing
from bank loans provided by state-owned banks. For example, Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) point
out that the Chinese banks–mostly state owned–tend to offer easier credit to SOE. Dollar and Wei
(2007) and Riedel et al. (2007) report that private firms rely significantly less on bank loans and
significantly more on retained earnings as well as family and friends to finance investments. Song et al.
(2011) also show that SOE finance more than 30 percent of their investments through bank loans
compared to less than 10 percent for domestic private firms, and other forms of official market financing
(through bank loans) are marginal for private firms in China as private firms rely more on internal
or informal financing. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that SOE in China face more credit access,
compared to DPE. At the same time, the literature also indicates that multinational companies have
better credit access than joint ventures as multinational companies are able to reallocate resources on
a global scale and finance their subsidiaries from headquarters or other affiliates. Therefore, according
to the theory presented above, when the scope for quality differentiation is large, we expect that,
ceteris paribus, the optimal prices set by SOE to be higher than those by DPE and the optimal prices
set by MNC higher than those by JV, respectively.
3.3.2 Measures of Credit Needs
Following Manova et al. (2011), we employ four different measures of an industry’s financial vulnera-
bility to proxy for credit needs at the industry level. The idea is that if an industry is more financially
vulnerable, it is more likely to face binding credit constraint. These measures have been widely used
in the literature on the role of credit constraints in international trade and growth. It should be noted
that these measures are meant to reflect technologically determined characteristics of each industry
that are beyond the control of individual firms. Therefore, these measures of industrial financial vul-
nerability are inherent to the nature of the industry, which should be viewed as exogenously given for
each individual firm.
These four measures are external finance dependence, R&D intensity, inventory-to-sales ratio, and
asset tangibility. An industry’s external finance dependence (ExtF ini) is defined as the share of capital
expenditure not financed with cash flows from operations. If external finance dependence is high, the
industry is more financially vulnerable and have higher credit needs. R&D intensity is defined as
R&D spending to total sales ratio (RDi), which can also reflect the industry’s financial vulnerability,
because research and development activities are capital-intensive. Typically, R&D expenditures, as
the impetus for production, occur before products can be manufactured and successfully marketed
and thus require large financial resource input. Third, we use inventory-to-sales ratio (Inventi) as it
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captures the duration of the manufacturing process and the working capital that a firm requires in
order to maintain inventory so as to meet demand. Last but not least, a measure of asset tangibility
(Tangi) can also capture the liquidity situation of an industry and it is defined as the share of net
value of fixed assets (such as plants, properties and equipments) in total book value assets. Among
these four measures, higher external finance dependence, R&D intensity, and inventory-to-sales ratio
imply tighter credit constraint (i.e., a higher d), while higher asset tangibility implies less stringent
credit constraints (i.e., a lower d or, equivalently, a higher θ) as tangible assets can serve as collateral
for borrowing and help to alleviate credit constraints. It may be debatable whether asset tangibility
belongs to credit needs measure or credit access measure. Nonetheless, regardless of whether we
view tangibility as indicator of credit needs or credit access, it does not change the fact that higher
tangibility implies less stringent credit constraint and, therefore, according to the theory, induces
higher export prices set by the firm. So we expect that the coefficients on ExtF ini, RDi, and Inventi
are negative, while the coefficient on Tangi is positive.
In the main tests, we employ these four measures of industrial financial vulnerability constructed by
Kroszner et al. (2007), based on data on all publicly traded U.S.-based companies from Compustat’s
annual industrial files. These measures have also been used by Manova et al. (2011). They are
constructed following the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Claessens and Laeven (2003).
They are averaged over the 1980-1999 period for the median U.S. firm in each sector, and appear to
be very stable over time. The four indicators of industries’ financial vulnerability are available for
29 sectors in the ISIC 3-digit classification system. As our dependent variable is export price of
products, we match the HS 6-digit product codes to those ISIC 3-digit sector categories by employing
Haveman’s concordance tables.13 This matching method has been adopted by Manova et al. (2011).
The rationale behind this matching is that we can categorize firms into different industries according
to what products they produce and, hence, sell to foreign markets. Therefore, when we use credit
needs measures based on US data in the baseline regression, we include product or product-destination
fixed effects at HS4 level rather than HS6 or HS8 level, because HS6-product fixed effects will absorb
the effect of credit needs. We acknowledge that this matching based on US data cannot be perfect.
Hence, in order to avoid any potential bias from the matching, we also use Chinese firm-level data
to directly construct the Chinese-data-based measure of credit needs at industry level to complement
our analysis using the US-data-based measures.
The reasons why we employ these credit needs measures based on US data in our main regressions
are twofold. First, the US is a developed country with mature financial markets. Thus, the credit
needs measures computed by US data are not distorted by limited credit supply, a typical situation in
developing countries, and can reflect the real credit needs associated with industrial characteristics.
Second, the differences of industrial credit needs based on US data are also persistent in a cross-
13The concordance table can be accessed via http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/Trade.
Resources/tradeconcordances.html.
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country setting. In fact, the application of these measures calculated based on US data to countries
other than the US is quite common in the literature (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Kroszner et al.,
2007; Manova et al., 2011). The rationale is that these measures in an industry of financial needs
are determined by the nature of the industry, which is supposed to be the same across countries.
As argued by Rajan and Zingales (1998), Kroszner et al. (2007), and Claessens and Laeven (2003),
among others, there is a technological reason why some industries depend more on external finance
than others and these technological differences persist across countries. Manova et al. (2011) also
argue that the ranking of industries in terms of their financial vulnerability remains relatively stable
across countries. In fact, Rajan and Zingales (1998) explicitly indicate that “most of the determinants
of ratio of cash flow to capital are likely to be similar worldwide: the level of demand for a certain
product, its stage in the life cycle, and its cash harvest period”. This implies that, in principle, the
measures calculated based on data from any country with well-functioning capital markets should be
applicable to our study. Therefore, we use an industry’s financial vulnerability calculated based on
US data as measures of its credit needs in our baseline regressions.
Finally, as a further test to show the robustness of our results, we also construct the major indicator
of credit needs, ExtF in, based on Chinese firm-level data.14 Our results are reported in Table 1 (in
ascending order of credit needs), which can be easily compared with the measures calculated based
on US data.15 Due to the immaturity of Chinese financial markets, capital expenditure by Chinese
firms could only reflect the part of their actual credit needs. As a result, the mean external finance
dependence in China is lower than that of the US.16 Nonetheless, we find that the rankings of industries
in external finance dependence in China and in the US are similar to each other, with reasonable
difference across industries as the two countries use different industrial classification system. This
is consistent with the finding in prior studies that the external finance dependence of U.S. firms is
a good proxy for other countries. For example, the tobacco industry is always at the top of the
ranking list and is less credit-constrained, while the petroleum products industry and professional and
scientific equipment industry are at the bottom of the ranking list as they are usually more technology-
intensive and need more external capital. It is worth noting that the CIC industry code is a different
classification system compared with HS or ISIC. Each firm belongs to one CIC, but it can produce and
export multiple HS8 products. To sort out the price variation due to product-level characteristics and
the potential correlation of error terms within each firm across products, when we use ExtF in based
on Chinese data, we include HS8-product or HS8-product-destination fixed effects and also cluster
errors at the firm level.17
14The ExtF in based on Chinese data is calculated at the 2-digit Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC) level.
15Data available in year 2004-2006 in the NBSC Database. We calculate the aggregate rather than the median
external finance dependence at 2-digit industry level, because the median firm in Chinese database often has no capital
expenditure. In our sample, approximately 68.1% firms have zero capital expenditure. Hence, we cannot use median
firm approach to calculate external finance dependence.
16According to our calculation, the mean external finance dependence in China is approximately -0.57 while the mean
external finance dependence from the US data is about -0.16.
17If we cluster error term at HS8-product or HS8-product-destination level, the results remain robust.
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3.3.3 Measures of Productivity
To capture firms’ productivity as a control variable in our regression analysis, we estimate both total
factor productivity (TFP) and labor productivity (measured by value added per worker).
For TFP we first use a Cobb-Douglas production function as estimation specification:18
Yft = AftL
βl
ftK
βk
ft (14)
where production output of firm f at year t, Yft, is a function of labor, Lft, and capital, Kft; Aft
captures firm f ’s TFP in year t. We use deflated firm’s value-added to measure production output.
We do not include intermediate inputs (materials) as one of the input factors in our main results
because the prices of imported intermediate inputs are different from those of domestic intermediate
inputs. As processing trade in China accounts for a substantial proportion of its total trade since
1995, using China’s domestic deflator to measure its imported intermediate input would raise another
unnecessary estimation bias (Feenstra et al., forthcoming). However, for robustness check, we also
estimate TFP by treating material as an intermediate input. It turns out that including intermediate
inputs (materials) in the estimation of TFP does not alter the results of our empirical test of the
theory.
As the traditional OLS estimation method suffers from simultaneity bias and selection bias, we
employ the augmented Olley-Pakes (1996) approach to deal with both the simultaneity bias and
selection bias in the measured TFP in the main part of our empirical test. Our approach is based on
the recent development in the application of the Olley-Pakes method, for example, Amiti and Konings
(2007), Feenstra et al. (forthcoming), and Yu (2011). However, to check for robustness, we also
employ other approaches to estimate TFP (e.g., Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg et al., 2006;
De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). We find that all variants of TFP estimate support the predictions
of the endogenous quality model that tighter credit constraints lower export prices. We briefly describe
the augmented Olley-Pakes method used in our TFP estimation as follows.
First, to measure a firm’s inputs (labor and capital) and output in real term, we use different input
price deflators and output price deflators, drawing the data directly from Brandt et al. (2012).19 In
Brandt et al. (2012), the output deflators are constructed using “reference price” information from
China’s Statistical Yearbooks and the input deflators are constructed based on output deflators and
China’s national input-output table (2002).
Second, we construct the real investment variable by adopting the perpetual inventory method to
model the law of motion for real capital and real investment. To capture the depreciation rate, we use
each firm’s real depreciation rate provided by the Chinese firm-level data.
18An alternative specification would be to use a trans-log production function, which also leads to similar estimation
results.
19The data can be accessed via http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/.
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Furthermore, to take into account firm’s trade status in the TFP realization, we include two trade-
status dummy variables–an export dummy (equal to one for exports and zero otherwise) and an import
dummy (equal to one for imports and zero otherwise), as in Amiti and Konings (2007). In addition,
as we are dealing with Chinese data and our sample period is between 2000 and 2006, we include a
WTO dummy (i.e., one for a year after 2001 and zero for before) in the Olley-Pakes estimation, as
have been done by Feenstra et al. (forthcoming) and Yu (2011). The WTO dummy can capture the
effect of China joining WTO on the realization of the TFP because the WTO accession in 2001 was a
positive demand shock for China’s exports. Our estimates of TFP coefficients at the 2-digit industry
level are reported in Table 2 and the magnitudes of our estimates are similar to those reported by
Feenstra et al. (forthcoming).
4 Main Results
In this section, we report our main results to support the predictions when quality is endogenous.
Interestingly, we also find evidence to support the exogenous-quality case and thus indirectly confirm
the mechanism of quality adjustment.
4.1 Credit Constraints and Export Prices
Our main interest is to study the impacts of credit access and credit needs on export prices. According
to Proposition 1, when quality is endogenous we expect that lower credit access or higher credit needs
lowers the optimal price set by the firm.
4.1.1 Baseline Results
We report our baseline results of equation (11) with the firm-product-country level prices as dependent
variable based on four measures of credit needs computed by US data in Tables 3 and 4. In each of
the four sets of results, we use three types of bank loans to GDP ratio and the different types of firm
ownership to control for credit access, and employ one of the four measures of financial vulnerability
(i.e., external finance dependence, R&D intensity, inventory-to-sales ratio, and asset tangibility) to
proxy for credit needs. Table 3 presents the results using external finance dependence in specifications
(1)-(5) and R&D intensity in specifications (6)-(10). On the other hand, Table 4 reports the results
based on inventory-to-sales ratio in specifications (1)-(5) and asset tangibility in specifications (6)-(10).
In Tables 3 and 4, specifications (1)-(3) and (6)-(8) show the regression results under three different
measures of credit access using bank loans. Specifications (4)-(5) and (9)-(10) include two firm-type
dummy variables: SOE, which is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to state-owned enterprises (SOE) and
0 if it belongs to domestic private enterprises (DPE); and MNC, which is equal to 1 if the firm is a
multinational corporation (MNC) and 0 if it belongs to a joint venture (JV). According to Proposition
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1 and further discussion on measures of credit access in Section 3.3.1, we expect the coefficients on
three types of bank loans as well as SOE and MNC to be positive under the endogenous quality
case. We find that the coefficients on all measures of credit access are positive and significant at
1% level, implying that firms with more access to bank loans set higher prices, and the prices set
by SOE and MNC are higher than the prices set by DPE and JV, respectively. These results fully
support Proposition 1 that tighter credit constraints resulting from lower level of credit access reduce
the optimal export price set by a firm, ceteris paribus.
Likewise, if quality is indeed an endogenous choice by the firm, according to Proposition 1 and
the further discussion of credit needs measures in Section 3.3.2, we expect the coefficients on external
finance dependence, R&D intensity, and inventory-to-sales ratio to be negative while the coefficients
on asset tangibility to be positive. This is because firms in industries with higher external finance
dependence, R&D ratio, and inventory-to-sales ratio face tighter credit constraints whereas those with
more tangible assets have more relaxed credit constraints. Again, the results presented in Tables 3 and
4 confirm Proposition 1: ceteris paribus, higher credit needs lowers the optimal prices with statistical
significance at 1% level.20
Next, we employ the firm-product level prices (i.e., log price by firm f for product h at year t) as
dependent variable and report the results in Tables 5 and 6. The results are consistent with those in
Tables 3 and 4.
Moreover, Proposition 1 predicts that export prices increase in productivity. The reason is that
firm productivity affects product prices through two channels. On the one hand, higher-productivity
firms have lower marginal costs, leading to lower product prices. On the other hand, more productive
firms choose to produce goods of higher quality, leading to higher product prices. As the quality effect
dominates, the total effect is that prices increase in productivity. In all specifications of the baseline
results in Tables 3-6, the coefficients on TFP are always significantly positive, consistent with the
predictions of the endogenous quality case.
4.1.2 Alternative Specifications
(1) Cross-sectional Estimation
The predictions from our model are cross sectional, i.e., we compare firms facing tighter credit
constraints with those who are not. Also the measures of credit constraints only capture the cross-
sectional pattern: the industry-level credit needs measures and the regional-level credit access measures
are both persistent and thus averaged over time. Therefore, to fully sort out the time variation effect,
20According to the corporate finance literature, external finance dependence might vary by nature for young firms and
mature firms. Therefore, in an alternative specification, we include firm age as control variable in the baseline regressions
and our baseline results are robust after controlling for firm age.
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we also estimate one year data (in 2004) using the following equation:
log pricefh(c) = b0 + b1 log(TFPf ) + γXf + χ1FinDevr + χ2ExtF ini + ϕh(c) + ǫfh(c). (15)
Table 7 reports the cross-sectional results: Columns (1)-(5) report results of equation (15) with
country index c and columns (6)-(10) report results without destination country index. The results
show that coefficients on credit access are all significantly positive across different specifications and
coefficients on external fiance dependence are all significantly negative. This suggests that tighter
credit constraints resulting from either lower credit access or higher credit needs indeed reduce export
prices. Also, most coefficients on TFP are still significantly positive, except for SOE in column (4).
This is potentially because larger SOE typically employ a lot of unnecessary labor to produce. As a
result, the estimated TFP of SOE may not accurately reflect their productivity.
(2) Different Fixed Effects
As we discussed earlier, the issue of adding different fixed effects terms is not straightforward since
our data contains multiple dimensions and the merging between US data and Chinese data further
complicates this issue. Nevertheless, we try different combinations of fixed effects terms with the
baseline regressions in Table 8. The left panel (columns 1-6) in Table 8 report results based on prices
across product-destination and the right panel (columns 7-12) report results of prices across product.
In each panel, the first five columns add 2-digit industry fixed effects, and all results regarding the
effects of credit constraints on export prices as well as the relationship between productivity and prices
remain similar as in the baseline.
It is more interesting to add firm fixed effects. The last column of each panel in Table 8 adds
firm-product-destination (or firm-product) fixed effects in column 6 (or 12) to identify whether the
relationship between credit needs (via external finance dependence) and export prices is operative
at the within-firm-product-country (or firm-product) level.21 Such a specification would moreover
provide a more stringent set of controls against the possibility of firm-level omitted variables. Again,
the results in columns 6 and 12 confirm the significantly negative coefficients on external finance
dependence, indicating that tighter credit constraints resulting from higher credit needs indeed lower
export prices even even at the most disaggregated, within-firm-product-country level. Also the positive
relationship between productivity and export prices still holds after adding such fixed effects.
(3) Clustering at Different Level
Another potential issue is a multi-way clustering issue (Cameron et al., 2011) since our data con-
tains multiple dimensions and also involves merging between US data and Chinese data. To better
address this clustering issue, we report the results by different clustering in Table 9. We cluster stan-
dard errors by 3-digit ISIC in columns 1-5, by province in columns 6-8, by ownership in columns 9-10,
21The credit access variables are dropped in these two specifications since they vary by firm.
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and by product in columns 11-15. We cluster by province and by ownership in some specifications
because our credit access measures are computed either by region or by ownership.
When clustering by ISIC or by product, the previous results, such as negative coefficients on
external finance dependence, still hold, further confirming that tighter credit constraints resulting
from higher credit needs indeed reduce the optimal price set by exporting firms. When clustering by
region, coefficients on total credits to GDP ratio and long-term loans to GDP ratio still remain positive
and significant at 1% level, and the coefficient on short-term loans to GDP ratio is also positive.22
When clustering by ownership, the two coefficients on SOE and MNC are both significantly positive,
further confirming that the relationship between credit access and export prices is consistent with
Proposition 1.
4.1.3 Results based on Chinese data
As all the above results use the credit needs measures based on US data, to further verify our baseline
results, we also compute the key measurement of credit needs—external finance dependence—using
Chinese firm data, and report regression results in Table 10. Specifications (1)-(5) of Table 10 use (log)
average export price by firm and HS8-product-destination as dependent variable, while specifications
(6)-(10) use (log) average export price by firm and HS8-product as dependent variable. As discussed
in Section 3.3.2, the ranking of industries in external finance dependence calculated based on Chinese
data is quite similar to the one based on US data. Thus, as expected, the results based on the external
finance dependence from Chinese data are also consistent with the predictions in Proposition 1: the
coefficients on credit access are significantly positive; the coefficients on credit needs are significantly
negative; the coefficients on TFP are significantly positive as well. The results are stated in Table 10.
To demonstrate robustness, in all subsequent analyses, we run two sets of regressions using external
finance dependence computed by US data and Chinese data, respectively.23
4.2 Credit Constraints and Export Quality
If the mechanism of quality adjustment is correct, according to equation (7) and Proposition 2, we
expect that given productivity, a firm with more credit access or less credit needs chooses higher
product quality. We now use estimated quality and quality-adjusted price to test this proposition.
Table 11 replicates the baseline regressions (specifications 1-5 in Table 3) by replacing export prices
with the estimated product quality as dependent variable in the left panel (columns 1-5). We find
that the coefficients on external finance dependence are negative, and the coefficients on credit access
measures are positive. Hence, quality choice is indeed affected by credit constraints. Moreover, the
22Financial development in a region is usually a long-run effect. This potentially could explain why the coefficient on
short-term loans to GDP ratio is not significant when clustering at province level.
23We report the results using the US-based measure of external finance dependence in the main tables, but the results
using the Chinese-based measure are also available upon request.
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effect of TFP on quality is also positive. Most effects are significant at 1% level with the predicted
signs, which verify the mechanism of quality adjustment.24
On the other hand, columns 6-10 in the right panel of Table 11 report the results of modified base-
line regressions by replacing export prices with quality-adjusted export prices as dependent variable.
Note that the quality-adjusted price is net-quality price, which already sorts out quality embodied
in price. Therefore, we expect the results based on quality-adjusted price are consistent with the
predictions of the exogenous quality case, i.e., higher credit needs increase (quality-adjusted) prices, a
higher level of credit access decreases the optimal prices, and a more productive firm set a lower price.
In Table 11, we do find that the coefficients on external finance dependence become significantly
positive, and the coefficients on TFP become significantly negative, exactly consistent with the pre-
dictions of the exogenous quality case. As for the credit access measures, among all five measures
of credit access, one of them now presents significantly negative effect on quality-adjusted prices.
The other four show smaller, less significant positive effect on quality-adjusted prices, compared with
the baseline regression results (see specifications 1-5 in Table 3). This suggests evidence to support
the endogenous quality case and the mechanism of quality adjustment, because the prediction of the
exogenous-quality case holds once we sort out quality effect from prices using quality-adjusted price.
4.3 Further Verification of Mechanism: Effects of Quality Variation across Firms
Our empirical results above show that predictions from the endogenous quality case are supported by
the data. To further compare the predictions of the endogenous and exogenous cases, we ask: compared
with the benchmark estimation results (see Table 3), what if quality presents more variation across
firms? It is safe to conjecture that in the product categories where there is more quality variation
across goods, the firms are more likely to behave according to the predictions of the endogenous quality
case. Conversely, in the categories where there is less quality variation across firms, we expect that
firms are more likely to behave according to the predictions of the exogenous quality case. Therefore,
if our theory is correct, we expect that the effects of credit constraints on prices are more pronounced
for product categories featuring more quality variation. In other words, in product categories with
more quality variation across goods we expect the product prices to be more negatively affected by
tighter credit constraints.
To confirm our conjecture, we use the variance of estimated product quality by different firms
for the same HS6-product to measure the variation of product quality for that product. Then we
rank products according to the variance of their estimated quality (i.e., quality variation) and create
a dummy variable which is equal to one if the product’s quality variation belongs to the top 50
percentile of quality variation among the whole sample, and equal to zero if it belongs to the bottom
24There is an exception for the coefficient on MNC which is still positive but less significant, perhaps because the
intra-firm trade volume and price could not totally reflect the product quality, which may lead to estimation bias for
product quality of MNC.
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50 percentile. Next we redo the baseline regressions by adding the dummy variable and the interaction
between the dummy variable and the measures of credit constraints and report the results in Table
12. Specifications (1)-(5) present the results across product and country, and specifications (6)-(10)
report the results across product.
The coefficients on the interaction terms are of special interest to us. We find that the coefficients
on the interaction term, ExtF in × Dummy, are significantly negative, and the coefficients on the
interaction between the credit access measures and the dummy variable are significantly positive.
This implies that firms producing in product categories with more quality variation across goods are
more negatively affected by tighter credit constraints. Therefore, this exercise further lends support
to the predictions of endogenous quality case.
5 Robustness Checks
In addition to the tests reported in previous tables, we test a number of other specifications for
robustness checks. We find the same patterns of impacts of credit constraints on export prices.
First, the results reported in the main tables are estimated using ordinary trade (as opposed to
“processing trade”) data as we believe firms doing processing trade behave differently from other
firms in their exporting behavior. In our sample, ordinary trade accounts for more than 73% of
total transactions. Thus the results based on ordinary trade in fact reflect the average situation in
our sample. However, to be cautious about the effect of credit constraints on export prices in the
entire sample, which includes different modes of trade, we include the data for processing trade in the
robustness checks and find that all predictions under the endogenous quality case continue to hold
(see Table 13).
Second, productivity is also estimated using different production functions and using different
estimation approaches. With the Olley-Pakes’s (1996) method, except for the main results we report,
we also estimate TFP with material as an input factor. We find that different TFP estimates do not
change our main results of the impact of credit constraints on export prices.
Beyond the O-P method, we report our regression results with labor productivity, without control-
ling for TFP, and with the TFP computed by Ackerberg et al.’s (2006) approach (ACF hereafter). We
use value added per employee to measure labor productivity and report the estimation results in speci-
fications 1-5 in Table 14. We find that all the main results are significantly preserved. As productivity
merely serves as a control variable when we test the effects of credit constraints on export prices, we
also estimate the baseline regression equation without controlling for productivity (see specifications
6-10 in Table 14). By dropping productivity, we can directly observe the overall impact of credit con-
straints on prices and we find strong evidence to support the negative impact of credit needs and the
positive impact of credit access on export prices. Furthermore, we employ De Loecker and Warzynski’s
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(2012) (henceforth DLW) augmented ACF approach together with the two sets of structural techniques
suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) (henceforth OP) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (henceforth
LP).25 The difference between the LP- and OP-embedded ACF/DLW approaches depends on whether
we use materials or investment to proxy for productivity. We report our regression results with TFP
estimates based on the LP- and OP-embedded ACF approaches in Table 15. Again, the results with
both variants of TFP estimates support the predictions under the endogenous quality case: tighter
credit constraints lead to lower export prices.26
6 Conclusion
In this paper we build a tractable trade model with heterogeneous firms to investigate the impacts of
credit constraints (via credit needs and credit access) on optimal export prices. Our model incorporates
endogenous product quality and credit constraints. The endogenous determination of product quality
is key to our model. As firms choose optimal product quality in the production of goods according
to the productivity and the credit constraints they face, tighter credit constraints induce firms to
choose lower product quality. We call this the quality adjustment effect. When the quality adjustment
effect dominates the price distortion effect induced by credit constraints, optimal prices decrease with
tighter credit constraints. On the contrary, under the exogenous quality case, the exact opposite effects
would hold, i.e., the optimal prices would increase with tighter credit constraints and decrease with
productivity. These contrasting empirical implications enable us to test empirically the endogenous
versus exogenous quality cases.
To test the predictions, we use different types of bank loans and firm ownership to proxy for different
levels of credit access and employ external finance dependence, R&D intensity, inventory-to-sales ratio,
and asset tangibility to proxy for credit needs. Our empirical results support the predictions under
the endogenous quality case. Interestingly, we also find evidence to support the exogenous quality
case by using quality-adjusted prices and using quality variations across firms, which further verifies
the mechanism of quality adjustment.
The main contribution of this paper is to offer both a theory and the empirical evidence concerning
the impacts of credit constraints on export prices set by firms. Our paper contributes to the emerging
literature on credit constraints and trade by linking credit constraints with firm attributes and actions
such as quality choice, optimal export prices, and productivity. Our paper also contributes to the
vast quality-and-trade literature in providing empirical evidence in support of the quality adjustment
mechanism.
25We follow DLW and ACF closely by using a value added translog production function y = βll+βkk+βlll
2+βkkk
2+
βlklk + ω + ε, where ω is productivity, and ε is error term (see equation (10) in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
26Note that the coefficients on TFP for SOE in columns (4) and (9) are not significant. This is potentially because
SOE with larger scale typically employ unnecessary labor to produce. Thus, the estimated TFP may not accurately
reflect SOE productivity.
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There are undoubtedly some limitations to our present study. One concern is that, like the previous
studies of credit constraints, we aggregate credit needs measures at the 2-digit industry level, without
taking into account the distribution effects of credit constraints within an industry. As Chaney (2005)
indicates, intra-industry distribution of liquidity constraints may impact exporting behavior. It is
reasonable to suspect that there are significant impacts of the distribution of credit constraints on
export prices as well as on the relationship between productivity and export prices. A thorough
analysis of this issue would be fruitful and is left to future research. Another limitation is that our
empirical findings and the theoretical predictions both build upon exogenous credit constraints. If
credit constraints are endogenously determined, some dynamic effects may emerge, and this would
affect the exit and entry of firms. In the present paper, our database does not include non-exporting
firms because data on domestic prices are not available at the firm-product level. If domestic-price data
are available, we should be able to construct a model to analyze the difference in firm dynamics between
exporters and non-exporters with respect to the impacts of credit constraints. For this endeavor, it
would be useful to acquire and construct firm- and product-level data on prices in domestic markets.
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7 Appendix
A The derivation for First-Order Condition: equations (4) and (5)
[Not for publication]
The optimization problem of a firm with productivity φ, credit access θ, and credit needs d is:
max
p,q,a
(
p−
τqα
φ
)
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y − fqβ
s.t. θ
[(
p− (1− d)
τqα
φ
)
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y − (1− d) fqβ
]
≥ d
[
τqα
φ
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y + fqβ
]
Let λ ≥ 0 denote the Lagrange multiplier. Then, the Lagrange function is given by:
L (p, q, λ) =
(
p−
τqα
φ
)
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y − fqβ
+λ
[(
p−
(
1 +
d
θ
− d
)
τqα
φ
)
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y −
(
1 +
d
θ
− d
)
fqβ
]
which is equivalent to:[
p−
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
τqα
φ
]
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y −
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
fqβ (16)
Totally differentiating the previous expression (16) with respect to price p and quality q yields:
(σ − 1) qσ−1
p1−σ
P 1−σ
Y = σ
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
τqα
φ
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y (17)
(σ − 1)
[
p−
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
τqα
φ
]
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y − α
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
τqα
φ
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y
=
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
βfqβ
(18)
According to equation (17), we derive:
p =
σ
σ − 1
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
τqα
φ
(19)
which is equation (4). Substituting equation (19) into equation (18), we derive:(
σ − 1
σ
− α
σ − 1
σ
)
qσ−1
p1−σ
P 1−σ
Y =
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
βfqβ
⇔ qσ−1
p1−σ
P 1−σ
Y =
σβ
(1− α) (σ − 1)
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
fqβ
which is equation (5). QED.
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B Proof of Proposition 3: Exogenous Quality
When there is no endogenous quality choice, the optimization problem of a firm with productivity φ,
credit access θ, and credit needs d becomes:
max
p,a
(
p−
τ
φ
)
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y − f (20)
s.t. θ
[(
p− (1− d)
τ
φ
)
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y − (1− d) f
]
≥ d
(
τ
φ
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y + f
)
(21)
Solving this optimization problem with respect to price p yields:
p =
σ
σ − 1
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
τ
φ
(22)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with budget constraint condition (21). Next, we
analyze this optimization problem under two cases.
Case I: The budget constraint (21) is binding. Now, the budget constraint (21) can be rewritten
as:
p1−σ
P 1−σ
Y =
(
1 +
1− θ
θ
d
)(
τ
φ
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y + f
)
(23)
This equation implies that the budget constraint (21) holds only in the zone p ∈ [pL, pH ] as shown in
Figure 2. When the budget constraint is binding, the first-best solution does not belong in this
zone. Now, the firm’s profit satisfies:(
p−
τ
φ
)
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y − f =
1− θ
θ
d
(
τ
φ
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y + f
)
(24)
Then the firm will choose the second-best solution pH in order to maximize its profit. We use
Figure 2 to illustrate: In Figure 2, the horizontal axis denotes p1−σ and the vertical axis denotes any
multiplicative scale of p1−σ. The dotted curve represents the right-hand-side of equality (23) with
intercept
(
1 + 1−θ
θ
d
)
f . The solid line represents the left-hand-side of equality (23). As shown in
Figure 2, given firm’s productivity φ, the dotted curve in Figure 2 will shift upward as credit needs d
increases or credit access θ decreases. As a result, p1−σ decreases and hence the optimal price increases
due to a rise in the optimal price distorted by 1+d (1−θ)λ
θ(1+λ) according to equation (22). Therefore, tighter
credit constraints (i.e., a higher d or a lower θ) lead to higher prices when quality is exogenous. Given
credit access θ and credit needs d, the dotted line in Figure 2 will shift downward when productivity
φ increases, implying that the optimal price decreases in productivity.
Case II: The budget constraint (21) is nonbinding. There is no distortion caused by credit
constraint in price setting and the optimal pricing rule is given by p = σ
σ−1
τ
φ
. Hence, the optimal price
is unrelated to credit constraint and decreases in productivity. QED.
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Figure 2: When Quality is Exogenous
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C Only Fixed Costs are Externally Financed
C.1 Endogenous Quality
The optimization problem of a firm with productivity φ, credit access θ, and credit needs d becomes:
max
p,q,a
(
p−
τqα
φ
)
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y − fqβ (25)
s.t. θ
[(
p−
τqα
φ
)
qσ−1
p−σ
P 1−σ
Y − (1− d) fqβ
]
≥ dfqβ (26)
Solving this optimization problem with respect to price p and quality q yields
p =
σ
σ − 1
τqα
φ
(27)
qσ−1
p1−σ
P 1−σ
Y =
σβ
(1− α) (σ − 1)
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
θ (1 + λ)
)
fqβ (28)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with budget constraint (26). The budget constraint
(26), together with the first-order conditions (27) and (28), imply
β
(1− α) (σ − 1)
(
1 + d
(1− θ)λ
1 + θλ
)
≥ 1− d+
d
θ
(29)
Then we also analyze two cases.
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Case I: The budget constraint (26) is binding. Now, equation (27), together with (29), imply:(
1− d+
d
θ
)
σfqβ−(1−α)(σ−1) =
(
σ
σ − 1
τ
φ
)1−σ Y
P 1−σ
(30)
Under the condition (i) β > (1− α) (σ − 1), there is positive correlation between firm productivity φ
and quality q. Combining the equations (30) and (27), the optimal price in this case is given by:
p =
(
1(
1− d+ d
θ
)
σf
)Ψ(
σ
σ − 1
τ
φ
)1+(1−σ)Ψ ( Y
P 1−σ
)Ψ
where Ψ = α
β−(1−α)(σ−1) . Under the two conditions: (i) β > (1− α) (σ − 1) and (ii) (σ − 1) − β > 0,
the optimal price increases in productivity. In addition, less credit access (i.e., a lower θ) or higher
credit needs (i.e., a higher d) leads to lower prices. The predictions are fully consistent with those in
the main model under the endogenous quality case.27
Case II: The budget constraint (26) is nonbinding. Based on the same derivation, the optimal
pricing rule also satisfies:
p =
(
(1− α)(σ − 1)
βσf
)Ψ ( σ
σ − 1
τ
φ
)1+(1−σ)Ψ ( Y
P 1−σ
)Ψ
Hence under the conditions (i) β > (1− α) (σ − 1) and (ii) (σ−1)−β > 0, the optimal price increases
in productivity. However, the optimal price is unrelated to credit constraints.
C.2 Exogenous Quality
The model goes back to the conventional Melitz-type model when quality is exogenous and the optimal
price is given by p = σ
σ−1
τ
φ
. Hence, the optimal price decreases in productivity. In addition, the optimal
price is independent of credit constraints. QED.
27Note that we have discussed why the parameter conditions for the endogenous quality case hold in the main model
section based on empirical evidence from previous literature.
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D Tables
Table 1: External Finance Dependence: US vs. China
Industry Name (US) ISIC value value CIC Industry Name (CHN)
Tobacco 314 -1.14 -2.59 35 General Purpose Machinery
Leather products 323 -0.95 -1.54 16 Tobacco
Footwear 324 -0.74 -1.34 41 Measuring Instruments and Machinery for
Cultural Activity and Office Work
Printing and Publishing 342 -0.42 -1.32 18 Textile Wearing Apparel, Footwear, and Caps
Pottery, china, earthenware 361 -0.41 -1.11 19 Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products
Furniture 332 -0.38 -0.93 34 Metal Products
Paper products 341 -0.35 -0.8 23 Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media
Other chemical products 352 -0.3 -0.72 20 Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood,
Bamboo, Rattan, Palm, and Straw Products
Non-metallic products 369 -0.29 -0.72 15 Beverages
Fabricated metal products 381 -0.25 -0.72 37 Transport Equipment
Apparel 322 -0.21 -0.65 21 Furniture
Industrial chemicals 3511 -0.19 -0.62 42 Artwork and Other Manufacturing
Food products 311 -0.15 -0.48 17 Textile
Non-ferrous metals 372 -0.12 -0.47 30 Plastics
Transport equipment 384 -0.08 -0.47 13 Processing of Food from Agricultural Products
Machinery, except electrical 382 -0.04 -0.44 27 Medicines
Petroleum refineries 353 -0.02 -0.44 39 Electrical Machinery and Equipment
Plastic products 356 -0.02 -0.41 28 Chemical Fibers
Rubber products 355 -0.02 -0.4 24 Articles For Culture, Education and Sport Activity
Textiles 321 0.01 -0.32 14 Foods
Beverages 313 0.03 -0.29 31 Non-metallic Mineral Products
Synthetic resins 3513 0.03 -0.27 36 Special Purpose Machinery
Glass products 362 0.03 -0.26 29 Rubber
Iron and steel 371 0.05 -0.23 26 Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products
Wood products 331 0.05 -0.1 33 Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals
Petroleum and coal products 354 0.13 0.02 40 Communication Equipment, Computers
and Other Electronic Equipment
Electrical machinery 383 0.24 0.07 22 Paper and Paper Products
Other manufactured products 390 0.28 0.33 32 Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals
Professional and scientific equipment 385 0.72 0.62 25 Processing of Petroleum, Coking,
Processing of Nuclear Fuel
mean -0.16 -0.57 mean
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Table 2: Total Factor Productivity of Chinese Firms (2000-2006)
Chinese Industrial Classification (2-digit code): Labor coeff Capital coeff
Processing of Food from Agricultural Products (13) 0..5136 0.2834
Manufacture of Foods (14) 0.5717 0.3562
Manufacture of Beverages (15) 0.5427 0.4335
Manufacture of Tobacco (16) 0.4559 0.6209
Manufacture of Textile (17) 0.4710 0.2279
Manufacture of Textile Wearing Apparel, Footware, and Caps (18) 0.5505 0.2313
Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products(19) 0.4801 0.2476
Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood, Bamboo, Rattan, 0.5021 0.2893
Palm, and Straw Products (20)
Manufacture of Furniture (21) 0.5871 0.1442
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products (22) 0.4960 0.3371
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media (23) 0.4939 0.2791
Manufacture of Articles For Culture, Education and Sport Activity (24) 0.5036 0.1299
Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing of Nuclear Fuel (25) 0.3238 0.4445
Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products (26) 0.3799 0.3485
Manufacture of Medicines (27) 0.5082 0.2284
Manufacture of Chemical Fibers(28) 0.5118 0.4046
Manufacture of Rubber (29) 0.4403 0.1651
Manufacture of Plastics (30) 0.4601 0.2859
Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products (31) 0.4173 0.2873
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals (32) 0.5029 0.3298
Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals (33) 0.4349 0.3244
Manufacture of Metal Products (34) 0.4443 0.3000
Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery (35) 0.4686 0.3035
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery (36) 0.4949 0.3610
Manufacture of Transport Equipment (37) 0.5488 0.3269
Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment (39) 0.4873 0.3097
Manufacture of Communication Equipment, Computers and 0.5327 0.2537
Other Electronic Equipment (40)
Manufacture of Measuring Instruments and Machinery for Cultural 0.4310 0.2347
Activity and Office Work (41)
Manufacture of Artwork and Other Manufacturing (42) 0.4649 0.2000
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Table 3: Credit Constraints and Export Prices across Product-Destination: External Finance Dependence and R&D
credit needs measured by ExtF ini credit needs measured by RDi
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Firm Characteristics
log(TFP) 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.029** 0.077*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.029** 0.077***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010)
log(Labor) 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.025*** -0.020* 0.008 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.026*** -0.020* 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.020* 0.051*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.020* 0.050***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008)
log(Wage) 0.251*** 0.277*** 0.245*** 0.167*** 0.305*** 0.252*** 0.278*** 0.246*** 0.169*** 0.305***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020)
Credit Needs
Extfin -3.465*** -3.484*** -3.445*** -3.995*** -2.959***
(0.325) (0.324) (0.325) (0.596) (0.342)
RD -31.92*** -32.06*** -31.76*** -37.81*** -24.87***
(4.468) (4.473) (4.457) (8.740) (4.801)
Credit Access
All Credits to GDP Ratio 0.301*** 0.300***
(0.023) (0.023)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.396*** 0.385***
(0.056) (0.056)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.556*** 0.558***
(0.040) (0.040)
SOE 0.267*** 0.269***
(0.053) (0.054)
MNC 0.078*** 0.079***
(0.022) (0.022)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product-destination fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931
Adjusted R2 0.570 0.569 0.570 0.623 0.525 0.568 0.567 0.569 0.621 0.524
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. All regressions include a constant term.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 4: Credit Constraints and Export Prices across Product-Destination: Inventory Ratio and Tangibility
credit needs measured by Inventi credit needs measured by Tangi
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Firm Characteristics
log(TFP) 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.030** 0.078*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.031** 0.078***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011)
log(Labor) 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.025*** -0.021** 0.008 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.025*** -0.021** 0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.019* 0.050*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.020* 0.050***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
log(Wage) 0.251*** 0.277*** 0.245*** 0.167*** 0.303*** 0.253*** 0.279*** 0.247*** 0.169*** 0.304***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.020)
Credit Needs
Invent -17.21*** -17.33*** -17.15*** -24.73*** -13.07***
(1.720) (1.718) (1.717) (4.265) (1.830)
Tang 1.002*** 1.039*** 0.973*** 1.060 0.900**
(0.297) (0.298) (0.297) (0.697) (0.413)
Credit Access
All Credits to GDP Ratio 0.300*** 0.301***
(0.023) (0.023)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.387*** 0.385***
(0.056) (0.057)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.557*** 0.559***
(0.040) (0.040)
SOE 0.274*** 0.275***
(0.054) (0.055)
MNC 0.077*** 0.078***
(0.023) (0.023)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product-destination fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931
Adjusted R2 0.568 0.567 0.569 0.621 0.524 0.567 0.566 0.568 0.619 0.523
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. All regressions include a constant term.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 5: Credit Constraints and Export Prices across Product: External Finance Dependence and R&D
credit needs measured by ExtF ini credit needs measured by RDi
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Firm Characteristics
log(TFP) 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.031** 0.062*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.031** 0.062***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009)
log(Labor) 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.033*** -0.005 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.034*** -0.005 0.039***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.013 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.013 0.056***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007)
log(Wage) 0.242*** 0.270*** 0.236*** 0.155*** 0.294*** 0.242*** 0.270*** 0.236*** 0.156*** 0.293***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.017)
Credit Needs
Extfin -2.510*** -2.524*** -2.499*** -3.014*** -2.213***
(0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.308) (0.201)
RD -20.29*** -20.40*** -20.21*** -28.12*** -15.71***
(1.699) (1.704) (1.695) (4.184) (2.716)
Credit Access
All Credits to GDP Ratio 0.305*** 0.305***
(0.020) (0.020)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.442*** 0.439***
(0.048) (0.048)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.554*** 0.555***
(0.033) (0.033)
SOE 0.216*** 0.215***
(0.050) (0.050)
MNC 0.080*** 0.080***
(0.018) (0.018)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1045695 1045695 1045695 225628 355856 1045695 1045695 1045695 225628 355856
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.479 0.481 0.534 0.434 0.479 0.478 0.480 0.533 0.434
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. All regressions include a constant term.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 6: Credit Constraints and Export Prices across Product: Inventory Ratio and Tangibility
credit needs measured by Inventi credit needs measured by Tangi
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Firm Characteristics
log(TFP) 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.032** 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.031** 0.062***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009)
log(Labor) 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.033*** -0.006 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.033*** -0.006 0.039***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.013 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.013 0.056***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007)
log(Wage) 0.242*** 0.270*** 0.236*** 0.155*** 0.293*** 0.242*** 0.270*** 0.236*** 0.155*** 0.293***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.017)
Credit Needs
Invent -8.89*** -8.91*** -8.87*** -11.07*** -8.70***
(0.606) (0.607) (0.605) (1.610) (0.928)
Tang 0.206 0.209 0.199 0.230 0.303
(0.132) (0.133) (0.132) (0.291) (0.234)
Credit Access
All Credits to GDP Ratio 0.305*** 0.305***
(0.020) (0.020)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.441*** 0.440***
(0.048) (0.048)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.555*** 0.555***
(0.033) (0.033)
SOE 0.218*** 0.217***
(0.050) (0.051)
MNC 0.079*** 0.079***
(0.018) (0.018)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1045695 1045695 1045695 225628 355856 1045695 1045695 1045695 225628 355856
Adjusted R2 0.479 0.478 0.480 0.533 0.434 0.479 0.478 0.480 0.532 0.434
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. All regressions include a constant term.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 7: Credit Constraints and Export Prices: Cross-sectional Pattern (Year 2004)
across product-destination across product
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(TFP) 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.029 0.082*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.061** 0.069***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.029) (0.015)
log(Labor) 0.016 0.013 0.015 -0.040** 0.012 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.027*** -0.023 0.042***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.014)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.034*** -0.015 0.038*** 0.028** 0.027* 0.030** -0.030 0.040***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.038) (0.010)
log(Wage) 0.279*** 0.307*** 0.272*** 0.164*** 0.328*** 0.268*** 0.296*** 0.261*** 0.0552 0.334***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.060) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.086) (0.024)
Extfin -3.369*** -3.386*** -3.354*** -4.224*** -2.302*** -2.604*** -2.617*** -2.595*** -3.405*** -1.818***
(0.375) (0.375) (0.375) (0.831) (0.315) (0.182) (0.183) (0.182) (0.399) (0.280)
All Credits to GDP Ratio 0.299*** 0.294***
(0.030) (0.030)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.380*** 0.430***
(0.074) (0.080)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.560*** 0.539***
(0.051) (0.048)
SOE 0.346*** 0.415***
(0.080) (0.105)
MNC 0.055* 0.090***
(0.030) (0.026)
Product-destination fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes no no no no no
Product fixed effect no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 531151 531151 531151 135971 163571 196255 196255 196255 45009 70629
Adjusted R2 0.570 0.569 0.571 0.613 0.524 0.482 0.480 0.482 0.522 0.445
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. All regressions include a constant term.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 8: Credit Constraints and Export Prices: Different Fixed Effects
across product-destination across product
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
log(TFP) 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.056*** 0.085*** 0.010*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.052*** 0.067*** 0.010**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.004)
log(Labor) 0.021** 0.018** 0.020** -0.027*** 0.008 -0.003 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.027*** -0.013 0.034*** -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.024** 0.055*** -0.006 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.022 0.066*** -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.005)
log(Wage) 0.233*** 0.259*** 0.228*** 0.141*** 0.290*** 0.007 0.220*** 0.246*** 0.215*** 0.129*** 0.277*** 0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.017) (0.007)
Extfin -3.428*** -3.445*** -3.409*** -3.946*** -2.948*** -1.616*** -2.449*** -2.461*** -2.440*** -2.929*** -2.166*** -1.306***
(0.319) (0.319) (0.320) (0.582) (0.340) (0.249) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.306) (0.196) (0.113)
All Credits to GDP Ratio 0.292*** 0.293***
(0.023) (0.020)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.369*** 0.423***
(0.055) (0.048)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.544*** 0.532***
(0.039) (0.033)
SOE 0.264*** 0.212***
(0.053) (0.049)
MNC 0.076*** 0.074***
(0.023) (0.019)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product-destination fixed effect no no no no no yes no no no no no no
Firm-product fixed effect no no no no no no no no no no no yes
Product-destination fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes no no no no no no no
Product fixed effect no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes no
Industry fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes no
Observations 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931 2808805 1045695 1045695 1045695 225628 355856 1045695
Adjusted R2 0.576 0.574 0.576 0.629 0.530 0.810 0.487 0.485 0.487 0.542 0.441 0.769
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. All regressions include a constant term.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 9: Credit Constraints and Export Prices: Clustering at Different Levels
Robust standard errors clustered by
3-digit level ISIC province ownership dummy product(HS4)
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
log(TFP) 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.029 0.077*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.029 0.077** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.029*** 0.077***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.027) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
log(Labor) 0.026** 0.024** 0.025** -0.020 0.008 0.026** 0.024* 0.025** -0.020 0.008 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.025*** -0.020*** 0.008**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.005) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.043** 0.044** 0.045*** 0.020 0.051*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.020 0.051* 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.020*** 0.051***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
log(Wage) 0.251*** 0.277*** 0.245*** 0.167*** 0.305*** 0.251*** 0.277*** 0.245*** 0.167 0.305** 0.251*** 0.277*** 0.245*** 0.167*** 0.305***
(0.055) (0.059) (0.052) (0.030) (0.062) (0.017) (0.021) (0.015) (0.042) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Extfin -3.465** -3.484** -3.445** -3.995** -2.959*** -3.465*** -3.484*** -3.445*** -3.995 -2.959* -3.465*** -3.484*** -3.445*** -3.995*** -2.959***
(1.379) (1.374) (1.384) (1.708) (1.020) (1.012) (1.019) (1.016) (0.850) (0.363) (0.340) (0.341) (0.340) (0.401) (0.336)
All Credits to GDP Ratio 0.301*** 0.301*** 0.301***
(0.038) (0.077) (0.007)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.396** 0.396 0.396***
(0.184) (0.314) (0.019)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.556*** 0.556*** 0.556***
(0.047) (0.106) (0.011)
SOE 0.267 0.267*** 0.267***
(0.167) (0.003) (0.016)
MNC 0.078*** 0.078* 0.078***
(0.021) (0.007) (0.007)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product-destination fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931
Adjusted R2 0.570 0.569 0.570 0.623 0.525 0.570 0.569 0.570 0.623 0.525 0.570 0.569 0.570 0.623 0.525
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 3-digit ISIC in columns (1)-(5), by province in columns (6)-(8), by ownership in columns (9)-(10), and by HS4 product in columns (11)-(15).
All regressions include a constant term. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Using prices at firm-product level instead of firm-product-country level does not alter the results in this table.
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Table 10: Credit Constraints and Export Prices: External Finance Dependence based on Chinese Data
across product-destination across product
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(TFP) 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.006* 0.059*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.016*** 0.049***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
log(Labor) 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.001 0.014*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.028*** -0.001 0.037***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.007*** 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.002 0.051***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
log(Wage) 0.186*** 0.208*** 0.181*** 0.100*** 0.233*** 0.213*** 0.237*** 0.207*** 0.122*** 0.253***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Extfin -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.030*** -0.035*** -0.029** -0.029** -0.031** -0.030** -0.021
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014)
All Credits to GDP Ratio 0.273*** 0.274***
(0.005) (0.009)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.356*** 0.396***
(0.012) (0.030)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.505*** 0.497***
(0.008) (0.013)
SOE 0.166*** 0.152***
(0.011) (0.020)
MNC 0.081*** 0.082***
(0.005) (0.008)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product-destination fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes no no no no no
Product fixed effect no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931 1045695 1045695 1045695 225628 355856
Adjusted R2 0.743 0.743 0.744 0.799 0.704 0.652 0.651 0.652 0.709 0.607
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. All regressions include a constant term.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 11: Export Prices across Product and Destination: Quality and Net-Quality Price (σi based on Broda and Weinstein (2006) )
Dependent Variable: Quality Dependent Variable: Net-Quality Price
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(TFP) 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.035*** 0.081*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(Labor) 0.024*** 0.022** 0.023** -0.008 -0.007 0.002 0.001 0.002* -0.012*** 0.015***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.023** 0.050*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
log(Wage) 0.231*** 0.254*** 0.228*** 0.152*** 0.287*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.018***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Extfin -3.545*** -3.567*** -3.526*** -4.064*** -3.121*** 0.080*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.069 0.162***
(0.335) (0.334) (0.335) (0.616) (0.358) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.043) (0.053)
All Credits to GDP Ratio 0.298*** 0.003
(0.024) (0.005)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.466*** -0.070***
(0.058) (0.011)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.526*** 0.030***
(0.042) (0.008)
SOE 0.220*** 0.047***
(0.054) (0.009)
MNC 0.028 0.050***
(0.024) (0.005)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product-destination fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.093 0.096 0.132 0.115 0.934 0.934 0.934 0.955 0.921
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. All regressions include a constant term.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Using ExtF in computed by Chinese data does not alter the results in this table.
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Table 12: Credit Constraints and Export Prices: Effects of Quality Variation
across product-destination across product
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(TFP) 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.029** 0.077*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.033** 0.063***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009)
log(Labor) 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.027*** -0.020* 0.008 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.034*** -0.007 0.039***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.019* 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.011 0.056***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007)
log(Wage) 0.251*** 0.276*** 0.245*** 0.156*** 0.306*** 0.241*** 0.269*** 0.235*** 0.140*** 0.295***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.017)
Extfin -2.816*** -2.823*** -2.801*** -3.253*** -2.408*** -2.062*** -2.061*** -2.033*** -2.391*** -1.752***
(0.305) (0.304) (0.304) (0.539) (0.312) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.290) (0.197)
Extfin × Dummy -0.902*** -0.922*** -0.915*** -1.118*** -0.791*** -0.556*** -0.580*** -0.587*** -0.858*** -0.569***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.121) (0.102) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.065) (0.059)
All Credits to GDP Ratio 0.183*** 0.206***
(0.023) (0.019)
All Credits to GDP Ratio × Dummy 0.196*** 0.175***
(0.015) (0.009)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.208*** 0.279***
(0.055) (0.047)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio × Dummy 0.343*** 0.312***
(0.030) (0.018)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.271*** 0.327***
(0.039) (0.032)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio × Dummy 0.471*** 0.394***
(0.033) (0.024)
SOE -0.010 -0.043
(0.041) (0.040)
SOE × Dummy 0.569*** 0.519***
(0.069) (0.049)
MNC -0.001 0.007
(0.021) (0.019)
MNC × Dummy 0.144*** 0.134***
(0.031) (0.023)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product-destination fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931 1045196 1045196 1045196 225600 355556
Adjusted R2 0.572 0.571 0.573 0.627 0.526 0.482 0.480 0.482 0.537 0.435
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. All regressions include a constant term.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Using ExtF in computed by Chinese data does not alter the results in this table.
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Table 13: Robustness: Credit Constraints and Export Prices (with Processing Trade)
across product-destination across product
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(TFP) 0.094*** 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.038*** 0.091*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.028** 0.044***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013)
log(Labor) 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.041*** -0.0101 0.036** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.005 0.073***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.018)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.028*** 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.017 0.077***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.008)
log(Wage) 0.296*** 0.317*** 0.293*** 0.182*** 0.378*** 0.294*** 0.319*** 0.291*** 0.165*** 0.378***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.022) (0.031) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.026) (0.031)
Extfin -3.148*** -3.175*** -3.131*** -3.965*** -3.187*** -2.522*** -2.536*** -2.513*** -3.013*** -2.366***
(0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.601) (0.402) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.305) (0.210)
All Credits to GDP Ratio 0.345*** 0.383***
(0.036) (0.035)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.654*** 0.760***
(0.071) (0.075)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.588*** 0.645***
(0.063) (0.060)
SOE 0.256*** 0.218***
(0.051) (0.050)
MNC 0.047 0.047*
(0.029) (0.026)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product-destination fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes no no no no no
Product fixed effect no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931 1045695 1045695 1045695 225628 355856
Adjusted R2 0.561 0.560 0.561 0.630 0.529 0.472 0.470 0.472 0.546 0.430
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. All regressions include a constant term.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Using ExtF in computed by Chinese data does not alter the results in this table.
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Table 14: Robustness: Credit Constraints and Export Prices (with Labor Productivity or without Controlling for TFP)
Labor Productivity No TFP
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(TFP) 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.052*** 0.093***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
log(Labor) 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.041*** -0.011 0.028* 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.036*** -0.015 0.023*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.007 0.025** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.019 0.049***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008)
log(Wage) 0.240*** 0.266*** 0.234*** 0.154*** 0.294*** 0.284*** 0.308*** 0.277*** 0.180*** 0.350***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
Extfin -3.464*** -3.483*** -3.443*** -3.990*** -2.958*** -3.475*** -3.491*** -3.455*** -4.003*** -2.978***
(0.324) (0.323) (0.324) (0.594) (0.342) (0.326) (0.325) (0.326) (0.599) (0.342)
All Credits to GDP Ratio 0.305*** 0.289***
(0.023) (0.023)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.412*** 0.358***
(0.056) (0.056)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.560*** 0.541***
(0.039) (0.040)
SOE 0.274*** 0.256***
(0.053) (0.052)
MNC 0.078*** 0.072**
(0.022) (0.022)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product-destination fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931
Adjusted R2 0.570 0.569 0.571 0.623 0.525 0.569 0.568 0.570 0.623 0.524
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. All regressions include a constant term.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Using ExtF in computed by Chinese data does not alter the results in this table.
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Table 15: Robustness: Credit Constraints and Export Prices (with TFP Computed by ACF (LP and OP) Method)
LP embedded ACF OP embedded ACF
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(TFP) 0.022** 0.019* 0.021** 0.003 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.019 0.062***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
log(Labor) 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.035*** -0.015 0.019 0.034*** 0.031** 0.033*** -0.018 0.015
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.019 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.022* 0.058***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008)
log(Wage) 0.273*** 0.299*** 0.267*** 0.179*** 0.320*** 0.269*** 0.294*** 0.262*** 0.171*** 0.317***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021)
Extfin -3.472*** -3.489*** -3.452*** -4.002*** -2.973*** -3.467*** -3.486*** -3.448*** -3.996*** -2.966***
(0.325) (0.324) (0.325) (0.598) (0.342) (0.325) (0.324) (0.325) (0.596) (0.342)
All Credits to GDP Ratio 0.294*** 0.296***
(0.024) (0.023)
Short-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.370*** 0.378***
(0.057) (0.057)
Long-term Loans to GDP Ratio 0.548*** 0.550***
(0.040) (0.040)
SOE 0.257*** 0.270***
(0.053) (0.053)
MNC 0.079*** 0.078***
(0.022) (0.022)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product-destination fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931 2808805 2808805 2808805 694928 825931
Adjusted R2 0.569 0.568 0.570 0.623 0.525 0.570 0.568 0.570 0.623 0.525
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm. All regressions include a constant term.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Using ExtF in computed by Chinese data does not alter the results in this table.
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